Abstract-Web 2.0 users need usable mechanisms for sharing their content with each other in a controlled manner across boundaries of content-hosting or application-service providers (CSPs). In this paper, we describe the architecture, design, and implementation of a proposed system for Web 2.0 content sharing across CSPs. With our approach, users use their existing email account to login to CSPs, and content owners use their email-based contact-lists to specify access policies. Users are assumed to be equipped only with a Web browser and CSPs do not need to change their existing access-control mechanisms. In addition, policy statements are URI-addressable, and the same access policies can be reused and enforced across CSPs.
I. INTRODUCTION
With Web 2.0, the user is both a consumer and provider of Web content [1] . However, today's Web is site centric. For each service provider, a Web user has to maintain a separate copy of identity, social relationships, and accesscontrol polices. In this paper, we use the term "walled garden" to refer to such an administrative domain defined by a service provider. Because each walled garden controls its own set of users and employs a different access-control mechanism to protect personal content, it is difficult to share personal content beyond walled gardens. For the purpose of illustrating our discussion, we will use the following scenario of Web content sharing as a running example:
Scenario 1: Alice is a Girl Scout in the Colonial Coast Adventures (CCA) club. She took pictures at a scout training event, and would like to use her favorite photo web site MyPhoto.com to share those photos online. In CCA, the policy is that pictures of training events can only be seen by CCA troop members and their parents. Alice would like to implement this policy and limit access to her photos accordingly. Jenny is another CCA member and Mary is her mother. In order for Mary to access Alice's photos for this event, Mary has to prove that she is the parent of Jenny and that Jenny is a CCA member. However, neither Jenny nor Mary are registered members of MyPhoto.com, and Alice does not know Jenny and Mary.
Personal content sharing is currently available in limited forms, with two main content sharing mechanisms offered by CSPs. The first one is to make user content public. Obviously, this is inadequate for controlled sharing. The second one is the walled garden approach. With this approach, the user who "owns" content can grant permissions directly to other users (or user groups) within the same CSP. The walled-garden approach is easy to implement and use. Its main limitation is that not all the desired content users (e.g., Girl Scouts and their parents) are necessarily registered with the corresponding CSP; and thus, users outside of that CSP cannot be granted selective access. Even within the same walled garden, the resource requester and owner might not be known to each other (e.g., Alice does not know some other Girl Scouts and their parents who use MyPhoto.com), increasing the challenge of controlled sharing for both the owners and consumers of content.
To share personal content with unknown users, one possible solution is to adopt a distributed authorization system that support the notion of trust and delegation, which provides a flexible way for a user to delegate authority to another user who is in a better position for defining attributes of other users. For example, Alice might trust the CCA troop to define its Scout members, even those members who are unknown to Alice. A user might want to use one attribute to make an inference about another attribute (e.g., Alice defines all Girl Scouts of CCA as her friends). In addition, a user might also want to delegate to unknown users based on their asserted attributes. For example, Alice trusts CCA to define its member Scouts; she then delegates the authority over the "parent" attribute to those scout members.
There are many existing distributed authorization systems (e.g., KeyNote [2] , SPKI/SDSI [3] , RT [4] ), each with a different level of delegation support. However, because Web 2.0 access policies for personal content are authored by users without special technical skills, and are enforced by mutually untrusted walled gardens, there are many challenges remaining to address. The first challenge is usability. The expressive power of a policy language must be balanced with usability. An average Web user must be able to comprehend the language to ensure that an access policy matches the owner's sharing intention. To be usable, the user-experiences provided by the sharing mechanism must leverage the Web skills and experiences that a Web user already has. Interoperability is the another challenge. Credentials and access policies that are authored in one policy provider must be employable to protect personal content residing on multiple CSPs. In addition, the solution should work under current walled-garden restrictions without requiring CSPs to change their existing access-control mechanisms.
In addition to usability and inter-operability, granularity of control and accountability should be considered as well. Content created by Web users is diverse and sometimes complex, a content owner should be able to specify accesscontrol in a fine-grained terms. For example, a content owner might want to protect a photo in an album, an event in a calendar, or even a paragraph within a blog. For accountability, a content owner should be able to know which data is being accessed, by who and when, and be able to revoke an authorization at anytime if necessary.
To address the aforementioned challenges, our work is based on the following design goals:
• Users are not required to set up a separate account and password on each service provider to view shared content.
• The user is assumed to be equipped only with a web browser. The sharing mechanism should be built upon the existing Internet infrastructure and open standards. It should not require any special software (e.g., browser plug-in, local proxy) being installed on end-user computers, or require public key/secret key, X.509, or SPKI/SDSI certificates managed by a user to perform cryptographic operations.
• The sharing solution should provide an additional channel for content sharing. CSPs are not required to change their existing access-control mechanisms.
• The confidentiality of credentials and access policies should be protected. Thus, credential statements should not be seen or exposed to unauthorized entities during an authorization process.
To achieve our design goals, we first reviewed existing literature to understand user content sharing practices. The most important findings that related to our work is that email is the most commonly used sharing mechanism [5] , [6] , [7] , and users tend to treat socially defined classes (e.g., friends, co-workers, family) the same when sharing [5] , [6] . In addition, we studied current sharing solutions provided by CSPs that enable users to share their content beyond walled gardens. Most CSPs (e.g., Google, Flickr, Facebook) support sharing through a secret-link, which is a hard-toguess URL that uniquely identifies a shared resource (e.g., http://picasaweb.google.com/Alice?sl=Gv1sRgCOzuv). When a resource owner shares personal content using a secret-link, the corresponding CSP creates a special URL for that resource. Anyone who knows the secret-link can access the content. To share specific personal content, a resource owner (sometimes with the aid of the CSP) sends the secret link via email to selected users. Message recipients view the shared content by clicking on the link. Secret-links are easy to use for both owners and users, and are easy to implement by CSPs. Secret-links provide a certain degree of control over sharing since only those who obtain (or guess) the link can access the content. However, the use of secret-links are not secure as they can be forwarded to unauthorized users. Another limitation is that a content owner has to know the recipient's email explicitly, which might be impractical in some sharing scenarios (e.g., Alice doesn't know Jenny and Mary).
In this paper, we propose an new approach for secure Web 2.0 content sharing beyond walled gardens. Based on the aforementioned findings, the main ideas behind our approach are: (1) reuse existing email accounts for global identification, (2) extend email-based contact-lists with the notion of trust and delegation for access control, and (3) leverage the existing secret-link mechanism for content sharing. Our approach has two main components: OpenID email and OpenPolicy providers. An OpenID email provider is an existing email provider that is augmented with an OpenID [8] identity service and an email-to-OpenID mapping service. OpenID email providers enable Web users to use their email to login CSPs while remain using OpenID identifier for identification. An OpenPolicy provider is a policy hosting provider that offers services for internet users to organize their credentials and polices, and for CSPs to make authorization decisions.
To evaluate our approach, we implemented a prototype on Facebook to allow Facebook users to share their photo albums with non-Facebook users. With our approach, the user experiences for content sharing are similar to the existing secret-link sharing mechanism. Content owners use their contact-lists hosted on OpenPolicy providers to specify delegation-enabled access policies. Using existing email accounts, content requesters do not need to setup an account on Facebook and do not require any special software installed to view shared content; Facebook does not need to change its access-control mechanism.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section discusses background and related work. Section III presents the detailed design of our proposed solution, and Section IV discusses the evaluation methodology and results. Section V summarizes the paper and outlines future work.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
In order to develop requirements for a mechanism to share Web content beyond walled gardens, we reviewed existing literature to understand user content sharing practices and identify the breakdowns users encounter when sharing. As we aimed to design a solution that can be operated across administrative boundaries, we also studied existing solutions in federated identity management and distributed authorization systems. In this section, we summarize the lessons we learned from existing research and discuss related work.
A. User Content Sharing Practices
To explore preferences for general information sharing, Olson et al. [9] investigated what content is shared and with whom. They find that participants abstract the details of sharing into high-level classes of recipients and information which are treated similarly. Voida et al. [5] studied the sharing practices of ten employees at a medium-size research organization to identify the types of content they share and with whom, the mechanisms they use to share, and how much control over the information they grant to the sharing recipients. They identified 34 different types of files that are shared among colleagues, friends, and families. One of the most important findings related to our work is that email is the most common mechanism for sharing (45%), followed by network folders (16%) and posting content to a web site (11%). The study also identified the breakdowns that users have experienced in their file sharing activities. The main classes of breakdowns are (1) difficulties in selecting a sharing mechanism with desired features that are available to all sharing participants, (2) forgetting what files had been shared and with whom, and (3) problems in knowing when new content was made available. Similarly, Whalen [6] conducted studies to investigate the file sharing practice in both work and personal context of about 200 employees at a US research institution. Most of her results confirm the findings made by Voida et al. In addition, she identifies the factors that influence the choice of sharing method used. She also found that a lack of activity information (e.g., who and when) on the shared files could be problematic for both security and collaboration.
Miller et al. [7] conducted an empirical study of the photo sharing practices in Flickr.com. They found that privacyconcerned users primarily use e-mail, supplemented with web galleries, to control the privacy level of different photos. The perception of using email for sharing by those users is that an e-mail message is intentional, requires no setup, and is targeted at a specific list of recipients. Miller et al. suggest that a sharing solution should look and feel much like e-mail, but with a more robust underlying framework geared to photo sharing.
B. Federated Identity Management
One of the limitations of the walled-garden approach for sharing is the challenge of having separate user identifiers with different CSPs. Users end up maintaining multiple identities and corresponding passwords at multiple sites, which leads to weaker passwords and/or password re-use across accounts [10] .
Federated identity management enables user attributes in one CSP to be provided to other CSPs in a federation. Solutions such as coalition-based access control (CBAC) [11] , Shibboleth [12] (based on SAML [13] ), and OpenID [8] are examples of federated identity systems. However, with the exception of OpenID, current federated identity solutions require pre-established agreements and trust relationships between IdPs and CSPs in a federation, essentially forming a larger walled garden by aggregating existing ones.
OpenID is an open protocol for web-based single-signon. OpenID is user-centric in the sense that users are free to choose their own OpenID identity providers. OpenID uses a URI as an end-user's identifier; this acts as a universal user account and is valid across all CSPs. The main advantage of using a URI as an identifier is that it can associate personal profile information and services (e.g., authentication, policy service). However, the usability of the OpenID identifier scheme could be improved as Web users perceive a URI as a "web address" instead of a personal identifier. In the context of Web content sharing, users rarely know the URIs of those with whom they want to share their content with, but they tend to know each other's e-mail addresses.
Users are often prompted to use an email address as their user ID [14] . For instance, major service providers (e.g., Google, Yahoo, AOL) use email addresses as user accounts to associate provided services. Our solution OpenID email enables Web users to use their email to login CSPs while transparently using OpenID identifier for identification. Thus, the user experience for registering and entering CSPs that support OpenID email would be the same as they experience today.
C. Distributed Authorization and Background of RT
In decentralized environments such as the Web, the content owner and the requestor often are unknown to each other (e.g., Alice does not know Mary and Jenny). There is a substantial body of literature addressing the problem of authorization within distributed environments.
PolicyMaker [15] coined the term "trust management" to denote an access control model in which authorization decisions are based on locally stored security policies and distributed credentials (signed statements), without explicit authentication of a requestor's identity and a centralized repository of access rules. Policies and credentials in PolicyMaker consist of programs written in a general programming language such as AWK. Although general, it is very hard to understand the overall access policy for a protected resource. KeyNote [2] , the next version of PolicyMaker, uses a C-like notation and regular expression syntax for describing conditions. SPKI/SDSI [3] is a digital certificate scheme for authorization, which provides methods for binding authorization privileges to keys and for localized name spaces and linked local names. A credential in KeyNote and SPKI/SDSI delegates certain permissions from an issuer to a subject. A chain of credentials can be viewed as a capability which authorizes the subject at the end of the chain. KeyNote and SPKI/SDSI do not support attribute inferencing and attribute-based delegation. RT [4] is a family of languages that add the notion of RBAC to the concept of trust management systems such as KeyNote and SPKI/SDSI.
In our approach, RT [4] is employed for expressing access-control policies. The RT language is a family of rolebased trust-management languages for representing policies and credentials in distributed environments. RT combines the strength of role-based access control (RBAC) [16] and trust-management (TM) [15] systems to form a concise and expressive language.
All policy statements and credentials in RT take the form A.r ←− exp, where A is an entity, r is a role, and exp is a role expression (a sequence of entities and roles). In this paper, we capitalize the first character of entities and use lower-case to represent roles. An entity in RT is a uniquely identified individual or process that can issue credentials and make requests, and a role is a set of entities who are members of this role. The above credential A.r ←− exp means that members(A.r) ⊇ members(exp) (i.e., exp is a member of A.r).
There are four types of credentials in RT , each corresponding to a different way of defining role membership and a different level of delegation:
• Type 1 A.r ←− B : An A defines an entity B to be the member of role r. For example, CCA certifies Alice as its Girl Scout member (CCA.scout ←− Alice), or Jenny asserts that Mary is her parent (Jenny.parent ←− M ary).
• Type 2 A.r ←− B.r 1 : The role A.r is defined to contain every entity that is a member of B.r 1 role. This statement can be used to represent a simple delegation from A to B, since B may affect the members of A.r by issuing new credentials. For instance, Alice defines all Girl Scouts in CCA as her scout friends Alice.scout ←− CCA.scout. The members of the Alice.scout role will dynamically change as CCA revokes or issues new credentials for its Scout members.
• Type 3 A.r ←− A.r 1 .r 2 : The role A.r is defined to contain B.r 2 for every B that is a member of A.r 1 . This represents a delegation from A to the members of A.r 1 . For example, Alice trusts CCA to define its scout members (Alice.scout ←− CCA.scout), and then delegates the authority over "parent" to those member scouts (Alice.scout parent ←− Alice.scout.parent). 
D. Related Work
Microsoft Live Mesh [17] aims to provide a centralized Web location for a user to store personal content that can be accessed and synchronized across multiple devices (e.g., computers and mobile phones). The user is able to access the uploaded content through a Web-based Live Desktop or her own devices with Live Mesh software installed.
Dropbox [18] offers a similar personal content sharing solution. When a user joins a shared folder, the folder appears inside their Live Desktop (or Dropbox), and syncs to their computers and devices automatically. Both solutions are easy to use, however, they accept only users within their own administrative domain and the sharing is explicit for each individual user (i.e., no grouping or delegation).
YouServ [19] enables users to share their content using their personal computers by leveraging technologies in personal Web servers, dynamic DNS, proxies, and replications. A user's YouServ content remains available and accessible even if they are using a dynamically-assigned IP address, or when the user's PC is offline (through a peer replicated site) or firewalled (through a proxy site). All YouServ-hosted content is publicly accessible unless it is contained within private folders. To control access, YouServ provides a singlesign-on authentication service for the YouServ community, and content owners whitelist other users in a file named access.txt to grant accesses. ScoopFS [20] is another personal Web server-based content sharing solution. The userinterface provided by ScoopFS resembles an email client, and each user has an unique mailbox identified by a WebKey [21] (similar to a secret-link). ScoopFS is designed for ease of use. The main limitation of ScoopFS is that content recipients need to install a copy of ScoopFS and manually exchange their Web-Keys in order to receive the shared content. Mannan et al. [7] proposed a scheme for personal web content sharing by leveraging the existing "circle of trust" in Instant Messaging (IM) networks. This scheme enables an owner's personal data to be accessible only to her IM contacts. However, both content owner and requester must be on the same IM network and the proposed system does not support trust and delegation.
Relationships between a content user and a content owner are intuitive to Web users and are commonly used to derive authorization decisions by CSPs. Carminati et al. [22] proposed an access control mechanism for web-based social networks, where policies are expressed as constraints on the type, depth, and trust level of existing social relationships. The proposed system requires a special software module running on an end-user's machine in order to derive access decisions, and delegation is supported in a limited way (only through the same relationships along relationship paths). Lockr [23] is another access control mechanism based on social relationships. The main limitation of Lockr is the expressive power of access policies as it simply uses value matching to derive access decisions. Thus, it cannot express delegation of relationship authority (i.e., friend's friend), and cannot denote authorized users using shared attributes (e.g., friends from a university). In addition, credentials have to be manually sent from issuer to recipient; to get access, users have to manually find/search appropriate credentials to construct the proof. III. APPROACH Figure 1 illustrates the system architecture of our proposed solution and data flows among main actors in the system. Its design is framed and guided by our previously proposed Web 2.0 content sharing model [24] . In this model, a user is not only a content owner and consumer, but a credential issuer as well. A user enrolls a set of identities (e.g., user name/password) from multiple identity providers to represent themselves when accessing shared content and constructing access polices. A content owner creates personal content on CSPs and associates that content with access-control polices that are hosted by a policy provider. To access shared content, a content consumer chooses an appropriate identity to make a request. Each request contains the identity provided by the consumer and a corresponding set of context information. Context information is the metadata of a request, such as user-specific profile attributes, current location, date/time of the request, and user credentials. A credential is an assertion of certified user-attribute from another individual user or an organization authority. To mediate accesses, a CSP requests authorization decisions from a policy provider to protect shared content. The policy provider then acts as a policy decision point (PDP), which responds with authorization decisions based on the context of the request and a set of pre-defined credentials and access policies.
A. System Architecture and Data Flows
As shown in Figure 1 , our proposed solution contains two additional players-an OpenPolicy provider and an OpenID email provider, in addition to the existing actors (Owner, User, CSP) from the secret-link sharing scenario. An OpenPolicy provider provides policy-hosting services for Internet users to organize their credentials and polices, and a set of web services for CSPs to make authorization decisions. An OpenID email provider is an existing email provider that is augmented with both an OpenID identity service and an Email to URL Translation (EAUT) [25] service. By combining these two services, our approach allows Web users to use their email to login to CSPs while using OpenID identifier for identification. Both OpenPolicy and OpenID email are user-centric, users are free to choose their favorite providers. The following steps illustrate the sequence for a user to login to a CSP using the OpenID email protocol:
1) User U presents her email e to CSP C.
2) C parses the domain d from e (as an email is in the form of user@domain) and prepends the string "http://" to d to form an EAUT Discovery Endpoint URL u.
3) C retrieves an XRDS-Simple document [26] on u,
and lookups values representing an EAUT Template or Mapping Service Endpoint URL m. 4) C translates or maps e to an OpenID identifier i via m. 5) Once C gets back the corresponding OpenID identifier i, the rest of the steps are the same as the original OpenID protocol. Assume a content owner has logged into her OpenPolicy provider using OpenID email protocol and has organized a set of credentials and access polices. To share content, the content owner clicks on the link of the content on a CSP. The CSP generates a secret-link based on the content and redirects the content owner to her OpenPolicy provider to specify a set of roles as the recipient of the shared content. The OpenPolicy provider then sends out the link to each member of the designated roles and calls back the CSP with the designated roles to construct an access-control list of the shared content. Figure 2 illustrates the sequence of steps for sharing content as explained below: 1) Content owner W specifies that content c residing on CSP C should be shared. 2) C generates a secret-link l based on content c. 3) C redirects W to her OpenPolicy provider P with secret-link l and a post-back URL b as part of payload. 4) P presents a role-selection user interface to W. 5) W specifies a set of roles R as the recipients of c. For instance, Alice specifies Alice.scout and Alice.scout.parent as the roles for recipients. 6) For each role r ∈ R, P sends out l to a set of destination email addresses E = { e | e ∈ members(r)} (e.g., the members of the Alice.scout role) by performing a distributed mailing with other OpenPolicy providers.
The details of the distributed mailing protocol are discussed in Section III-B. 7) Once the distributed mailing is completed, P calls b on C with R and l in the payload. 8) C finds content c based on l and then stores the tuple (l, c, R) to serve as an access-control list of c. We now provide the data flow for accessing shared content. A user requests access by presenting a secretlink to a CSP. The CSP prompts the user for an email account and redirects the user to her OpenID email provider for authentication. Once authenticated, the OpenID email provider redirects the user back to the CSP with a claimed OpenID identifier and a token that the CSP can verify. After the claimed OpenID identifier is verified, the CSP retrieves the roles associated with the shared content and requests an access decision from the owner's OpenPolicy provider. For each authorization request, the CSP provides the OpenPolicy provider with the user's OpenID identifier and the associated role to determine whether the request should be permitted. Figure 3 illustrates the flows for accessing shared content as explained below: 1) To access a shared resource, user U presents l to CSP C (e.g., by clicking on the link in her email box). 2) C prompts U for email e and redirects U to her OpenID email provider O with secret-link l.
3) U authenticates herself to O. 4) Once authenticated, O redirects U back to C with an OpenID identifier i and l. 5) Based on l, C lookups the stored tuple (l, c, R) to find content c and roles R. 6) For each role r ∈ R, C requests an access decision from the conetnt owner's OpenPolicy provider P with r and i to determine whether the request should be granted. 7) P performs a distributed containment query for each r with respect to i. A containment query Q takes the form r i. Q is true if i ∈ members(r). The access to c is granted only if Q holds. The details of the distributed containment query algorithm are discussed in Section III-B, OpenPolicy Service. 8) C returns c to U if any one of the containment queries returns true.
B. OpenPolicy Provider
As illustrated in Figure 4 , the OpenPolicy provider provides (1) a web-based policy editor for users to construct their online credentials/policies, (2) a web-based sharing module for users to associate access polices with shared content, (3) a distributed mailing module to send out secretlinks, and (4) a distributed authorization module for CSPs to make access decisions. At its core is a distributed inference engine, which consists of a membership query module and a containment query module. The membership query module takes a goal role A.r and a set of credentials C as inputs and computes a set of entity members E of A.r as an output. For each e ∈ E, the distributed mailing module emails a copy of secret-link l to e. Similarly, the containment query module takes a goal role A.r and a user U as inputs and returns whether U ∈ members(A.r). The containment query result is used by the distributed authorization module to determine wether a request made by a user U should be granted.
Our proposed membership and containment query algorithms are based on the notion of a credential graph, as introduced by Li et al. [27] . A credential graph G is a directed graph that represents a set of credentials C and their relationships. For each credential A.r ←− exp ∈ C, there is one node for A.r in G, one node for exp, and an edge exp A.r that links exp to A.r. A proof graph G p is a subgraph of credential graph G that is rooted by a given goal role and contains additional nodes derived from Type 3 and Type 4 credential statements. Our algorithms use the proof graph as a helper data structure for computing the members of a given role A.r. To construct a proof graph, our design uses another data structure that we call a proof stack, which is a stack for storing the nodes to be processed during a derivation process.
Algorithm 1 shows the detail of a distributed membership query. It takes a goal role and a set of credentials as inputs and computes a set of members of the goal role as an output. Algorithm 1 processes one node in the stack at a time until the stack is empty. Initially, only the goal node (i.e., A.r) is added to the proof graph and is pushed onto the stack. A node in the proof stack is the basic processing unit, each node consists of the following properties:
• exp: the role expression of this node (e.g., B, A.r, A.r1.r2, or
• parents: the set of nodes this node is a member of.
• solutions: the set of entity nodes that can reach this node. Solutions are propagated to a node's parents in the following way. When a node e 2 is added to the solution of e 1 (e 2 e 1 ), all existing solutions of e 2 are appended to the solutions of e 1 and then propagate to e 1 's parents as well. Solution propagation is illustrated in Algorithm 2 (lines 3 to 8).
• linked roles: the set of linked role names. This property is used to process a Type 3 linked role A.r1.r2. The details are discussed below.
• intersection nodes: the set of intersection nodes. This property is used to process a Type 4 linked role f 1 ∩ f 2 ∩ . . . f k . The details are discussed below. For a credential statement A.r ←− exp, we define function RHS (A.r ←− exp) = exp (i.e., right-handside) and LHS (A.r ←− exp) = A.r (i.e., left-handside). If exp is a linked-role (i.e., in the form of A.r1.r2), then function PrimaryEntityRole(A.r1.r2) = A.r1 and SecondaryRole(A.r1.r2) = r2. If exp is an intersection-role (i.e., in the form of
To process a Type 2 role node A.r (Algorithm 1, lines 10 to 16) in the stack, the algorithm finds all credential statements that defines A.r. For each credential A.r ←− exp, it creates a node for exp in the proof graph, if none exists, pushes the newly created node onto the stack (addNode function), and then adds an edge exp A.r. The addEdge(exp, A.r) function of the proof graph adds A.r to the parents set of exp and propagates exp's solutions to A.r.
To process a Type 1 entity node B (Algorithm 1, lines 7 to 9), the algorithm simply adds B to B's solutions. Solutions of B are then propagated into all B's parents as shown in Algorithm 2 (lines 3 to 8).
A Type 3 A.r ←− A.r 1 .r 2 statement defines A.r to contain B.r 2 for every B that is a member of A.r 1 . To process a Type 3 linked node A.r1.r2 (Algorithm 1, lines 17 to 24), the algorithm creates a node for A.r1 and adds role name r2 to A.r1's linked roles property. When a new solution B is added to A.r1, Algorithm 2 (lines 9 to 13) creates a node B.r2 and adds an edge B.r2 A.r1.r2 to the proof graph. Thus, when a solution D is added to B.r2, D is propagated to A.r1.r2 automatically according to Algorithm 2 (lines 6 to 8).
A Type 4 A.r ←− f 1 ∩ f 2 ∩ . . . f k statement defines A.r to contain the intersection of all the roles f 1 , · · · , f k . To process a Type 4 linked node f 1 ∩ f 2 ∩ . . . f k (Algorithm 1, lines 25 to 30), the algorithm creates k nodes, one for each f i , and adds the current node f 1 ∩ f 2 ∩ . . . f k to the intersection nodes of f i . When a solution B is added to the solutions of f i , the current intersection node is notified to add B to its partial solutions property (Algorithm 2, line 16). The partial solutions property of a intersection node maintains a set of potential solutions, each associated with a counter. When the count of a potential solution D reaches the number of roles in the intersection role expression f 1 ∩f 2 ∩. . . f k (in this case, k), an edge D f 1 ∩f 2 ∩. . . f k is added to the proof graph (Algorithm 2, lines 17 to 19).
Similarly, the distributed containment query takes a goal role A.r, a user U and a set of credentials as inputs, and returns a boolean indicating whether U ∈ members(A.r). The logic for constructing a proof graph is very similar to the membership query algorithm. The only difference is that this algorithm checks whether U ∈ members(A.r) holds for each node being processed. If U ∈ members(A.r) holds, the function returns immediately. Each member of A.r is represented in form of an email, but U can be an email or an OpenID identifier. When U is in the format of an OpenID, the distributed authorization module use OpenID email EAUT service to map each solution of A.r into an OpenID before checking whether U ∈ members(A.r).
C. Security Considerations
Sensitive information (e.g., user name/password, authorization queries) is passed among different parties in our design. To prevent network data sniffing and man-in-middle Node n = S.pop(); 7: if n.type == 1 # entity node B # then 8: addSolution(n, n, G p , S); 9: end if 10: if n.type == 2 # role node A.r # then 11: find C r = { c | LHS(c) = n.exp, c ∈ C}; 12: for each credential c ∈ C r do 13: Node n = addNode( RHS(c), G p , S);
14:
G p .addEdge(n , n); 15: end for 16: end if 17: if n.type == 3 # linked-role node A.r1.r2 # then 18: n = addNode(PrimaryEntityRole(n.exp), G p , S); 19: n .linked roles.addRole(SecondaryRole(n.exp)); 20: for each solution e ∈ n .solutions do 21: n = addNode( e+'.'+SecondaryRole(n.exp), G p , S);
22:
G p .addEdge(n , n); 23: end for 24: end if 25: if n.type == 4 # intersection-role node
for each role expression f in n.exp do 27: n = addNode(f , G p , S); 28: n .intersection nodes.add(n); 29: end for 30: end if 31: end while 32: return G p .findNode(R).solutions; attacks, we require all communications between parties to take place over SSL.
Trust relations in RT language are transitive (i.e., A trusts B, and B trusts C, implies A trusts C). However, for a given role A.r, a malicious user M could achieve unauthorized access (i.e., M ∈ members(A.r)) if M can manage to be trusted anywhere along the path of A.r's credential chain (e.g., A.r ←− B.r, B.r ←− C.r, C.r ←− M ). To prevent unlimited transitive trusts, our design allows a user to specify a depth of trust for each credential statement. For instance, credential A.r (2) ← − B.r means depth of trust 2 from A to B over B.r. Depth of trust 1 means A only trusts B for defining the members of B.r. Depth of trust n means B can further delegate this authority down to n − 1 levels. During membership and containment queries, solutions beyond the specified trust depth are ignored. for each node n ∈ N .parents do 6: addSolution(n, E, G p , S);
end for 8: end if 9: for each role expression r ∈ N .linked roles do 10: Node n = addNode(E.exp+'.'+r), G p , S);
11:
Node n = G p .findNode(N.exp+'.'+ r);
12:
G p .addEdge(n , n); 13: end for 14: for each node n ∈ N .intersection nodes do 15: addPartialSolution(n, N , E) ; 16: if RoleCount(n.exp) = count of E in n's partial solutions then 17: addSolution(n, E, G p , S); 18: end if 19: end for Trust relations are not necessarily commutative (i.e., M trusts A does not imply A trusts M ). Email spam and DoS attacks are possible if a malicious user M could request any other user A for their credential statements. To prevent unauthorized requests, our design treats credential and policy statements as sensitive resources that must be protected. Our design allow a user to specify, for a given goal A.r, only entities that are included in the Type 1 statements of A.r (i.e., A.r ←− B) are allowed to perform query upon A.r. In addition, our design provides tools for users to specify additional credential access policies in order to allow other users to perform queries upon a given role. For instance, the following credential access policy CCA.allow(CCA.scout) ←− Bob will grant Bob query permission to CCA.scout, even though Bob is not included in the Type 1 statements of CCA.scout.
Phishing attacks on federated identity protocols are a looming threat. OpenID and other similar protocols (e.g., Google AuthSub, AOL OpenAuth, Yahoo BBAuth) may cause users to become accustomed to being redirected to identity provider websites for authentication. If users do not verify the authenticity of these websites before entering their credentials (and they usually do not [28] , [29] ), phishing attacks are possible. To prevent phishing attacks, users must confirm the authenticity of an identity provider before entering their credentials. Existing research on authenticating web-sites to users include security indicator [30] , secure bookmarks for known websites [31] , [32] , and automated detection and blacklisting of known phishing sites [33] . However, studies suggest that security indicators are inef- fective at preventing phishing attacks [29] , [28] , and blacklisting known phishing sites still suffers from high rate of false-positives and false-negatives [34] . Even with improved security indicators, users still tend to ignore them [35] , [28] . How to make OpenID protocol more resilient to phishing attacks is an important task of our future work.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
To evaluate our approach, we implemented an OpenID email provider and OpenPolicy provider in J2EE. To support OpenID protocols, we reused OpenID4Java [36] , an open-source Java library that offers support for implementing OpenID identity providers and consumer (relying party) web-sites. OpenPolicy uses Apache Tomcat as a web container and stores credential statements in a MySQL database. To validate the design of our prototype implementation, we developed a Facebook application to enable Facebook users to share their private photo albums with non-Facebook users via our proposed sharing architecture.
In addition to validating the correctness of data flows and inference logic, the runtime latency incurred during authorization decision processes was another important concern. To evaluate the performance characteristics of OpenPolicy, we deployed OpenPolicy on three hosts within our institution's internal network. To evaluate the portability and to ensure the performance measurements were not skewed by hardware and operating system, we used a different OS and hardware for each machine. The configurations were as follows: (A) Intel Duo Core 2 2.4GHz CPU, 4GB RAM, running Windows Vista, (B) Intel Duo Core 2 2.6GHz CPU, 4GB RAM, running MacOS 10.5.6, and (C) AMD Opteron Processor 142 CPU, 8GB RAM, running Linux 2.4.27. Testing machines were connected over a local area network with 100Mbps Ethernet adapters. Round-trip latency was less than 0.1 millisecond on average in this configuration.
To evaluate the performance characteristics of containment queries, we wrote scripts to create a set of credentials for each OpenPolicy server and then triggered OpenPolicy to perform a worst-case containment query (i.e., A.r D, but D is not a member of A.r), which enumerated all credential statements on all testing servers. The performance results are shown in Figure 5 . For each run, a different number of credential statements (i.e., 5,000 to 25,000) are generated on each server, and a different number of threads (i.e., five to twenty threads) are invoked to simulate concurrent authorization requests.
To improve authorization response time, OpenPolicy caches proof graphs. When proof graphs are cached, the response time becomes linear to the number of servers involved in the query process. In our testbed, the worst-case response time was less than 3 milliseconds when caching was used. Proof graph caches can greatly improve the response time of OpenPolicy. However, when the size of the cached graphs exceeds available memory, cache efficiency begins to degrade. As future work, we plan to use other cache strategies to improve cache efficiency. We also want to apply authorization recycling [37] techniques to derive access-control decisions directly on CSPs based on cached authorization responses from OpenPolicy providers.
V. CONCLUSION
Since the beginning of the Web, "identity wars" have led to service providers building "walls" to protect their customer-base. However, these "walls" restrict the evolution of the Web. In this paper, we described the design, architecture, and implementation of a proposed system for secure content sharing beyond walled gardens. In the future, we plan to conduct usability studies on our prototype implementation to ensure the proposed mechanisms are usable for average Web users. For phishing prevention, we plan to explore the feasibility of OpenID functioning without relying on redirection between CSPs and OpenID identity providers. For performance, we plan to investigate other cache strategies and apply authorization recycling techniques on CSPs to improve authorization response times.
Our proposed approach promotes user-centric access control. In our vision of a truly user-centric Web 2.0, users own their personal content and are free to share it across and beyond walled gardens. Users also have the freedom to choose their favorite providers for their identities, content, social relationships, and access-control policies. The separation of personal content and services puts the focus of a service provider on providing value services to the user it serves, forcing the service provider to be just a service providerno longer requiring users to compromise their identity or expand their social graphs unnecessarily to share content.
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